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I. INTRODUCTION
The certification of defendant class actions pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure raises a number
of concerns regarding fairness to the absent members of the de-
fendant class and the extent to which the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize such litigation. These concerns are so sig-
nificant that Rule 23 should be revised.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes
defendant class actions, which were historically permitted at eq-
uity.1 Defendant class actions have been rationalized on the ba-
sis that they serve the broad policy interests underlying Rule 23;
they promote judicial efficiency by bringing many small parallel
actions together into one action2 and facilitate the "enforcement
of legislative and constitutional norms" by allowing a uniform
class-wide remedy.3 Despite the long history of defendant class
* Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law.
1. Rule 23 provides: "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as repre-
sentative parties on behalf of all ... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). Former
Equity Rule 38 provided: "When the question is one of common or general interest to
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole." Equity Rule 38, re-
printed in, 4 R. FosTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 4617 (6th ed. 1922) (em-
phasis added); see also Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938); Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
2. Efficiency is one of the fundamental goals of class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3) (mandating "the fair and efficient adjudication" of cases); see also Marcera v.
Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lombard v.
Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979). In Marcera, a defendant class action was brought by a
plaintiff who sought reform of jail policies after various individual actions proved ineffec-
tive. Despite numerous successful suits against individual counties in New York, the ma-
jority of counties had persisted in unlawful jail visitation policies. Pursuing a class action
obviated the need to sue each county individually.
3. Comment, Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 1371, 1378 (1984); see also Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299 (1973) ("The [class action] procedure is merely one means
of transforming legal rights into effective remedies."); Developments in the Law-Class
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actions, until recently little consideration has been given to Rule
23's protection of the absent members of a defendant class.
4
Rule 23 authorizes three general types of class actions,5 and
defendant class actions have been certified under each type.8
Rule 23(b)(1) authorizes class actions when "separate actions
Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1353 (1976) ("Class action procedures assist courts in
giving full realization to substantive policies. .. ").
4. The advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
directly address the application of Rule 23 to defendant class actions. Although the ques-
tion of fairness has been treated by several commentators, they have written from a
perspective advocating the use of defendant actions. See, e.g., Parsons & Starr, Environ-
mental Litigation and Defendant Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4
ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 888-97 (1975); Comment, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil
Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REv. 283, 287 (1985); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91
HARv. L. REV. 630 (1978). While no quantitative information is available on the number
of defendant class actions, most commentators sense that the device is being used with
increasing frequency. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 1371; Comment, Personal Ju-
risdiction and Rule 23 Defendant Class Actions, 53 IND. L.J. 841, 841 & n.6 (1978).
5. Rule 23(b) provides in pertinent part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against the individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
6. See, e.g., In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (defendant class
certified under 23(b)(1)); Technograph Printed Circuits v. Methode Elecs., 285 F. Supp.
714 (N.D. IM. 1968) (certified under 23(b)(1) and (2)); Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d
1231 (2d Cir.) (defendant class certified under 23(b)(2)), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United
Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974) (certified under 23(b)(3)); In re Gap Stores
Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (defendant class certified under 23(b)(3)).
However, recently some dispute has arisen concerning whether Rule 23(b)(2) applies
to defendant class actions. See, e.g., Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 923 (1987), further proceedings deferred, 484 U.S. 1057
(1988); Comment, supra note 3, at 1376-78. See also infra notes 160-75 and accompany-
ing text.
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.. . would establish incompatible standards of conduct"7 or
when separate adjudications would, as a practical matter, deter-
mine the rights of absent parties or impair or impede the ability
of absent parties to protect their rights.' Rule 23(b)(2) autho-
rizes class actions in which "the party opposing the class has ac-
ted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole."9
Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes a third type of class action when "the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over individual questions" and a class action is the
superior means of litigating the law suit.10
In some situations, particularly under the current language
of Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), judgment could be entered
against an absent defendant without sufficient representation,"
actual notice,'2 the ability to "opt out" of the class,13 the ability
to intervene, 14 personal jurisdiction, proper venue, 16 or the
ability to raise choice of law questions. 7 Each of these concerns
implicates basic notions of fairness, another value inherent in
rule 23.18
In addition to these fairness concerns, a judgment rendered
under the above circumstances may violate Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 82, which limits the ability of federal courts to ex-
pand their jurisdiction through the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.19 If jurisdiction or venue limitations prevent the plaintiff
from suing certain defendants individually, a straightforward
application of Rule 82 prevents the plaintiff from seeking judg-
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
9. FED. R, Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
11. See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 67-100 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
18. "[T]he representative party [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (A class
action must be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy.").
19. Rule 82 provides: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." FED. R.
Civ. P. 82.
909]
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ment against those same defendants by simply using a defend-
ant class action.20
Finally, the problem is compounded because, although Rule
23 explicitly authorizes defendant classes, it is drafted from the
perspective of a plaintiff class action.21 Thus, many courts have
restricted the use of Rule 23 against defendant classes.22
II. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS IN RULE 23 DEFENDANT CLASS
ACTIONS
All three types of class actions that may be certified under
Rule 23(b) must meet the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): 1) the
class must be "so numerous that joinder of all members is im-
practicable"; 2) the claims or defenses must include "questions
of law or fact common to the class"; 3) the claims or defenses of
the representative party must be "typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class"; and 4) the representative party must "fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class."'23 Thus, ade-
quate class representation of the typical claims and defenses of
the class is a fundamental due process protection expressly guar-
anteed under Rule 23(a).
24
Actual notice of the pendency of the action is not expressly
required to be given to absent class members for actions main-
tained under either 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2); Rule 23(c)(2) explicitly
requires notice only in actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(3).25
This notice provision has not been interpreted to extend beyond
its express language.26 Furthermore, absent members of 23(b)(1)
and (2) classes are not afforded the right to "opt out" of the
class. Rule 23(c)(3) expressly provides that all members of a
class certified pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1) or (2) are bound by
any judgment entered in the action while members of 23(b)(3)
classes are bound only if they received the requisite notice and
20. See infra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
21. Comment, supra note 4, 33 UCLA L. REv. at 287; see also infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44. In practice, however, purported "ade-
quate" representation may fall short of protecting the interests of absent class defend-
ants. See infra notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
25. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2) provides in relevant part: "In any class
action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the
class the best notice practicable under the circumstances .... " Id.
26. See infra notes 67-79 and- accompanying text.
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did not request exclusion. Finally, litigants are not guaranteed
a right of intervention under any of the three types of actions
should they desire to personally protect their interests in the lit-
igation.28 Instead, Rule 23(d)(2) gives the court discretion to re-
quire notice in 23(b)(1) or (2) class actions or to permit inter-
vention in any class action "for the protection of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action.
29
The requirements of adequate class representation and no-
tice, as well as the ability to "opt out" of the class or intervene,
are generally relied on in 23(b)(3) actions to protect the due pro-
cess interests of absent class members.3 0 While adequate class
representation applies, the other three of these safeguards are
not guaranteed to absent class members in Rule 23(b)(1) and (2)
class actions. The absence of actual notice and the ability to opt
out of the class or intervene imposes a severe burden on absent
defendant class members. Even without such burdens, the Su-
preme Court recently pointed out that the burdens placed on
absent defendants are significantly more onerous than those
placed on absent plaintiffs.31 Absent members of a defendant
class are subject to the full power of the forum to enter a judg-
ment against them.3 2 Even though the absent class action de-
fendants are not required to appear and defend on pain of a de-
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). Rule 23(c)(3) provides in relevant part:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and de-
scribe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in
an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
Id.
28. See infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). Rule 23(d) provides in relevant part:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appro-
priate orders:. . .(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such
manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in
the action or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and ade-
quate, to intervene and present claims and defenses, or otherwise to come into
the action . . ..
Id.
30. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808-12 (1985); Han-
sberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
31. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808.
32. Id.
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fault judgment, they may be required to appear and participate
in discovery,"3 subjected to the law of a forum with which the
defendant has had no contact, 34 and subjected to the full reme-
dial powers of the court and compelled to respond affirmatively
to a judgment.3 5
Without the protection of notice, an absent defendant class
member is foreclosed from participation in the lawsuit and yet is
bound by the judgment.36 Even when notice is effectively given,
active participation in the litigation is still denied. Absent mem-
bers of a 23(b)(1) or (2) class action cannot defend individually
with their own choice of counsel because no "opt out" opportu-
nity is provided.37 However, active participation in the class liti-
gation is also thwarted because no absolute right of intervention
is available.38 Moreover, even if intervention were a viable op-
tion, the cost would be the loss of traditional jurisdiction, venue
and choice of law related defenses. 39 Thus, the two avenues for
33. See infra note 131.
34. See infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
35. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808. Some commentators have minimized the adverse impact
of defendant class actions by implying that at some point in the litigation each defend-
ant must appear before the court and will be permitted to litigate individual issues at
that time. E.g., Note, supra note 4, at 637 n.40 ("[A] loss by the defendant class will not,
without more, lead to a final determination that particular individuals owe anything to
the plaintiff; each person asserted to be a member of the class must be given an opportu-
nity at some point to present any individual defenses he may have."). This assertion is
based merely on the fact that some defendant class actions have allowed such mini-trials.
However, these same commentators argue that personal jurisdiction and venue need only
be obtained over the named representatives, id. at 638, implying that at least individual
defenses of lack of jurisdiction and venue would not be available to absent class members
even at a later mini-trial. Moreover, the mini-trials, to the extent they occur at all, are
usually for the purpose of determining the extent of damages after a binding class liabil-
ity judgment is entered. See, e.g., Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
36. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500
(1938); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Northern Natural Gas
v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
37. See FEn. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(3). In fact, in a true "catch-22" reasoning process, the
inability of the absent class member to opt out has been used as a justification for not
providing notice. See Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1181 (D.R.I.
1976) ("At the present stage of these proceedings and in view of the class members'
inability to opt out, the court does not believe that notice is necessary or expeditious to
resolution of the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction."); Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 255 (3d Cir.) ("[M]andatory notice is required in (b)(3)
actions for the effective operation of the 'opt out' provision .... The 'opt out' proce-
dure, however, is not necessary for the protection of ... [the] (b)(2) class .... In this
proceeding, the claims of each member of the class rest squarely on the same issue and
the need for individual notice is superfluous."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
38. See infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 117-42 and accompanying text.
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increased representation and participation in the litigation, opt-
ing out and intervention, are unavailable to most absent class
action defendants.
While the chance of all these problems arising in the same
case may be small, the current version of Rule 23 provides no
guidance on how to deal with these questions when they do
arise. The treatment by courts has been uneven and inconsis-
tent, jeopardizing both the defendant's rights and the eventual
enforceability of defendant class action judgments. This article
proposes that Rule 23 be revised so that absent members of a
defendant class are always afforded actual notice and the ability




The burdens placed on absent defendants have been justi-
fied on two grounds: 1) the representative adequately protects
the absent party's interests, and 2) because the relief requested
is generally injunctive or declaratory in nature and directed
against members of unincorporated associations or groups of
public officials, the burden on the absent defendant is not as on-
erous as damages.41 On close examination neither of these justifi-
cations truly protects the absent party's interest in the
litigation.
The emphasis on adequate representation as protection for
the due process interests of absent defendants is rooted in the
40. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
41. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); United States v. Trucking Employers,
Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 99 (D.D.C. 1976) ("[M]embers of the class need not be brought per-
sonally before the Court as long as the requirements of due process-in this context,
primarily notice and representativeness of named class members-are afforded them.");
United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 105 (D.D.C. 1976) ("Rule 23
recognizes ... [the due process problems of a defendant class action] and mandates that
the interests of such involuntary absent defendants be protected by a determination by
the court that the interests of named and non-party defendants coincide sufficiently that
the substantive positions taken by the named defendants will protect the interests of the
nonparty defendants."); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (citing Han-
sberry for the proposition that the safeguards of Rule 23 protect against due process
problems); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968)
("We think that the essential requisite of due process as to absent members of the class
is not notice, but the adequacy of representation of their interests by named parties."),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971); Note, supra note 4, at 637-45 (arguing that suits
against members of unincorporated associations or unions and suits seeking injunctions
or declaratory judgments against local public officials rarely raise problems of adequate
representation).
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Supreme Court's decision in Hansberry v. Lee.42 The Hansberry
Court reasoned that "a selection of representatives for purposes
of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or
even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to re-
present, does not afford that protection to-absent parties which
due process requires."4
The Hansberry decision has been relied on as the primary
due process protection for absent class members. Consequently,
adequate representation has been held out as the most impor-
tant, and sometimes exclusive, element necessary to protect ab-
sent class members' due process interests." The result is that
"adequate representation" has come to mean either a lack of
conflicts between the class representatives and the absent class
members or a generalized inquiry into whether the action will be
fair.45 In fact, the gist of the Hansberry decision is that collusion
42. 311 U.S. at 32. In Hansberry, the Court addressed the issue of whether a judg-
ment entered in a class action was res judicata as to absent members of the class. The
plaintiffs in Hansberry brought an action for an injunction to enforce a restrictive cove-
nant in a series of deeds which prohibited the sale of property to blacks. Several years
earlier a class action had been brought in state court by some of the property owners on
behalf of all the owners in which the state court declared the enforceability of the cove-
nants. Burke v. Kleinman, 277 IM. App. 519 (1934). The defendants in Hansberry were
blacks who purchased property from the absent members of the original class. The plain-
tiffs argued that the sales to the defendants were void, in violation of the racially restric-
tive covenant and the earlier court order. They argued that the earlier class action de-
claring the validity of the covenants was res judicata in the present action because the
property owners who sold to the defendants were bound as members of the class.
The Supreme Court held that a class judgment rendered in a class action suit can be
res judicata as to absent members of the class only where the class was adequately repre-
sented. The Court concluded that the earlier decision was not binding because the class
had not been adequately represented; not all members of the class had an interest in
seeing the restrictive covenant enforced.
43. 311 U.S. at 45.
44. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Cross v. National Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1031 (6th Cir.
1977) ("In making the determination of adequacy of representation the district court
should consider the experience and ability of counsel for the plaintiffs and whether there
is any antagonism between the interests of plaintiffs and other members of the class they
seek to represent."); Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 137 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (court
found representation was adequate because, "there [was] no apparent antagonism be-
tween the interests of the class and . . . [the named defendants]" and because the
named defendants "have vigorously and conscientiously pursued all necessary and ap-
propriate defenses applicable to all members of the class"); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89
F.R.D. 104, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("The prerequisite of adequacy of representation will be
satisfied where the court is assured of vigorous prosecution (or defense), and where there
is no conflict between the representative of the class and the other class members.");
Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 116 (C.D. Cal. 1978) ("There are
two aspects to the prerequisite of adequate representation: first, the legal representation
of the named plaintiff must be competent and, second, the interests of the representa-
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between the class representatives to the detriment of the class
members violates the latter group's due process rights. The
Court, however, did not purport to deal with every circumstance
that could lead to inadequate representation. Nor did it purport
to formulate the definitive test for adequacy of representation.
Even if Hansberry provides the definitive analysis as to absent
plaintiffs, the question of absent defendants was not before the
Court and the opinion cannot be read as the final resolution of
their interests.
The conditions surrounding representation in a defendant
class are very different than the "parallel" conditions of a plain-
tiff class. In a defendant class action, the plaintiff, under scru-
tiny of the court, designates the representative defendant. This
defendant is often an unwilling representative that did not want
to undertake class representation.
The plaintiff's designation of a representative may enhance
the chances of inadequate representation because the designated
defendant may have a relatively small stake in the outcome of
the litigation or may lack the necessary financial and legal re-
sources to adequately conduct the litigation. Richardson v.
Kelly46 provides an example of what can happen when a plaintiff
selects the defendant class representative. In Richardson, absent
members of a defendant class attempted to collaterally attack a
judgment which imposed individual assessments on them and
required them to participate in the receivership of an insurance
association of which they were members.
The facts of Richardson deserve special attention. An ear-
lier suit on a similar cause of action had been filed by the re-
ceiver against a class consisting of all the members of the insur-
ance association (over 3000), naming 190 representative
defendants.47 That suit, however, was voluntarily dismissed by
the receiver after some of the named defendants indicated they
would vigorously contest liability. Later, the receiver refiled the
suit against the same class listing only twenty-eight named de-
fendants. The receiver testified that he purposefully omitted
naming any of the defendants who had shown interest in con-
testing the earlier suit since they would interfere with his ability
to obtain a favorable outcome.4s Of the twenty-eight named de-
tives and the class must be free from conflicts."). -
46. 144 Tex. 497, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945).
47. Id. at 500, 191 S.W.2d at 859.
48. Id. at 516-17, 191 S.W.2d at 868 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting).
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fendants in the second suit, six defaulted, two were dismissed,
and fifteen settled small claims prior to trial. Of the five defend-
ants who appeared at trial, two did not object at trial and two
settled after trial. The only remaining named defendant had
only an $18 liability and did not appeal the adverse class judg-
ment.49 None of the twenty-eight named defendants had poten-
tial liability exceeding $850, although some of the unnamed de-
fendants had liability exceeding $16,000.50
The absent class members in Richardson did not receive no-
tice of the pending action."' In addition, the absent class action
defendants argued that the plaintiffs selected defendant repre-
sentatives "who would have neither incentive or ability to de-
fend the suit and who could be dissuaded from appealing. '52 As
the dissent concluded, "[t]he Receiver had by negotiations or
otherwise eliminated from the case everyone who had the neces-
sary interest and the inclination to make a vigorous defense of
the suit. ' 53 The Texas Supreme Court disallowed the collateral
attack, deferring to the trial court's unexplained finding that the
parties "constitute a class whose rights . . . are fairly and truly
represented herein by the named defendants appearing and
answering.' 54 Although Richardson may be passed over as an
aberration, it illustrates the potential for abuse where the class
action rule does not provide adequate guidance on the conduct
of defendant class actions.
Courts and commentators have tended to minimize the im-
pact of the plaintiff's designation of the defendant representa-
tive.55 The primary argument is that the self-selected plaintiff
representative is just as likely to be an inadequate representa-
tive as the plaintiff-designated defendant representative. These
commentators rely on the potential liability of the defendant
and the supervisory power of the court as mechanisms to insure
the selection of an adequate defendant representative." As one
commentator noted, "[s]o long as the defendant class represen-
49. Id. at 502, 191 S.W.2d at 860.
50. Id. at 516-17, 191 S.W.2d at 868 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 514, 191 S.W.2d at 867 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 512, 191 S.W.2d at 865.
53. Id. at 517, 191 S.W.2d at 868 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. (quoting trial court opinion) (emphasis in original).
55. In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Parsons & Starr, supra
note 4, at 896-97; Williams, Some Defendants Have Class: Reflections on the Gap Se-
curities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 287, 291-92 (1981); Note, supra note 4, at 641-42.
56. Williams, supra note 55, at 291; Note, supra note 4, at 641-42, 646-47.
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tative has some kind of personal interest in the issue to be de-
cided by the class action, and so long as that issue is common to
the other class members as well, the representative in vigorously
defending himself will more or less automatically defend every-
one else in the class."' 57 This argument ignores the reality of cur-
rent litigation practice. As Richardson demonstrates, a mere
theoretical opposition to the plaintiff's position is insufficient.
An adequate representative must have identical interests with
those class members who have the most to lose and would
fiercely contest the plaintiff's position.
Furthermore, other factors beyond vehement opposition to
the opposing party's position and identical interests with other
class members are necessary for a class representative to be ade-
quate. An adequate representative must have the resources nec-
essary to represent the class. These concerns are magnified in a
defendant class action. In a plaintiff class action, the representa-
tive plaintiff, a volunteer, presumably would not undertake the
financial burden of representing a class in the absence of ade-
quate resources or the prospect of a large verdict. Moreover, in
many plaintiff class actions, the case is handled on a contingent
fee basis whereby counsel is provided incentive to take the case
by the possibility of recovering large awards and court ordered
fees." Absent such economic incentives, a plaintiff would not
likely volunteer to represent a class.
In comparison, a defendant class representative will seldom
be able to take advantage of the same fee incentives as a plain-
tiff representative.5 9 Although some commentators have sug-
gested that the fees of the representative defendant be appor-
57. Note, supra note 4, at 639-40.
58. Contingent fees are, by definition, only available to plaintiffs.
Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted
in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical bases of
their acceptance are that (1) they often... provide the only practical means
[for obtaining competent counsel], and (2) a successful prosecution of the
claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmIrrY EC 2-20 (1980) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). See Comment, supra note 3, at 1385 n.103 ("In contrast [to representa-
tive defendants], representative plaintiffs may be reimbursed. . . by contingent fee ar-
rangements . . . or by statutes authorizing attorney's fees in successful public rights
litigation."); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
375, 390-92 (1972) (pointing out that attorneys representing plaintiffs in class actions
have frequently recovered very high fee awards).
59. Comment, supra note 3, at 1385 ("The defendant class representative cannot
expect to recoup these additional costs sinde a successful defense will merely exculpate
the representative along with the entire class.").
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tioned among the class members or be assessed to the plaintiff,
no definitive rule as to the disposition of attorney's fees exists
for defendant class actions.6 0 Consequently, the defendant repre-
sentative must be prepared to assume some, if not all, of the
economic burden of the litigation.
Neither is court scrutiny of the adequacy of representation
necessarily a sufficient protection of the absent defendant's in-
terests. The motion for class certification is generally considered
early in the litigation, before the merits of the action have been
thoroughly reviewed.61 The inadequacy of the defendant's repre-
sentation may not be apparent at such an early stage in the liti-
gation. Furthermore, the court is not usually in a position to
conduct its own investigation into the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the various potential defendant representatives.
Rule 23 does provide discretionary methods for the judge to en-
hance the adequacy of representation, such as providing notice
to absent class members.62 However, if the reasons for inade-
quacy are not apparent from the face of the litigation, no ration-
ale for optional notice or other discretionary protections would
exist. While these concerns are present in any class action they
are heightened in a defendant class because of the onerous im-
pact of inadequate representation.
Moreover, relying on collateral attack to protect absent de-
fendants from inadequate representation is problematic. First,
the collateral attack method of correcting inadequate represen-
tation is inefficient and unnecessarily implicates extra judicial
resources. Second, it imposes a heavier burden on the defendant
than a defense in the original action would impose. Most courts
are likely to require a higher standard of proof on collateral at-
tack as a result of strong policies in favor of finality. 3 Thus, col-
lateral attack holds little chance of success.
60. Kline v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 235 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 963 (1975); M. OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 65 (2d ed. 1971); Wil-
liams, supra note 55, at 293.
61. Rule 23(c)(1) provides that the motion to certify a class should be considered
"as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). In
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973), the court pointed out that whether
representation was, in fact, adequate can only be tested in hindsight.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2), supra note 29; see, e.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No.
735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1374 (6th Cir. 1977), (court ordered discretionary notice under
23(d)(2) so that absent class members could object to the class representative), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 876 (8th Cir.
1977).
63. See generally Moore, Collateral Attack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Cri-
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The nature of the adversary process also fails to guarantee
adequate representation. The plaintiff certainly has little inter-
est in informing the court of potential weaknesses in the defend-
ant's representation. And although the named defendant may be
motivated to dispute the adequacy of representation, self inter-
est would decrease the credibility of the defendant's inadequacy
arguments. Thus, none of the named parties are in a position to
contest the adequacy of defendants' representation.
The motives of a named defendant are also suspect when
the named defendant willingly accepts the burden of class repre-
sentation. Herbert Newberg suggests that the willingness of a
defendant to serve as the class representative, or at least the
agreement of the defendant with the plaintiff's selection, may
render the defendant an inadequate representative. 4 The di-
lemma posed by this analysis is troubling. If a defendant truly
believes he or she is not an adequate representative of the class,
his or her vigorous opposition to the class certification may well
be considered "a positive factor" militating toward certifica-
tion. 5 Yet, a defendant who believes that class litigation will be
advantageous and agrees to serve as representative after selec-
tion by the plaintiff may, by mere willingness, be considered an
inadequate representative. Because the motives of the named
parties are suspect whether they select, contest, or approve of
the defendant representative, the adversary system fails to en-
sure adequate representation in defendant class actions.
Moreover, the adequacy of representation in a defendant
class action may also be threatened by the named defendant's
unwillingness to serve in a representational capacity. Class rep-
resentation is clearly inadequate if the named defendant simply
refuses to defend the action. In addition, by failing or refusing to
consider how defense strategy affects absent class members, the
unwilling defendant's representation could be inadequate. The
strategy for conduct of litigation is significantly altered by the
representational qualities of the suit. Thus, even when they re-
present their own interests and do not refuse to defend, unwill-
ing defendants may be inadequate.
Finally, the adversary process is not easily corrected once a
defendant representative is selected. Although the decision to
tique of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534 (1981).
64. 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.58, at 398 (2d ed. 1985) (citing
Marcera v. Chinlund, 91 F.R.D. 579 (W.D.N.Y. 1981)). '
65. Id. at 397; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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certify may be reconsidered at some later point in the litigation,
the additional burden of such reconsideration and the potential
for a reversal of the litigation strategy-make such reconsidera-
tion unusual and generally unsuccessful in the absence of "mate-
rially changed or clarified circumstances or the occurrence of a
condition on which the original class ruling was expressly
contingent." 6
The adequacy of representation in a defendant class action
is not insufficient by definition. However, the foregoing discus-
sion shows that the adequacy of representation doctrine has se-
vere limitations and will not always protect the due process in-
terests of absent defendants.
B. Notice
Much effort has been expended in the debate over whether
and what type of notice to the absent members of a class action
is required by Rule 23 and the Constitution.6 7 Rule 23(c)(2) re-
quires that the "best notice practicable" be provided to class
members "who can be identified through reasonable effort" in a
23(b)(3) action. In Eisen v. Carlisle-& Jacquelin, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the drafters of Rule 23(c)(2) intended to
"fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action
procedure is of course subject."' 9 The Court held that notice by
publication did not satisfy this requirement where names and
* addresses of over two million class members were available.
70
66. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 64, § 7.47, at 86 ("[Clourts should not condone a
series of rearguments on the class issues by either the proponent or the opponent of the
class, in the guise of motions to reconsider the class motion.").
67. See Rutherglen, Notice, Scope and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA.
L. REV. 11 (1983); Wolfsohn, Sending Notice to Potential Plaintiffs in Class Actions
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Trial Court's Role, 54 FORDHAM
L. REV. 631 (1986); Comment, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions: "Playing Fair"
with National Classes, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1487 (1984); Note, Notice to Class Members
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Representative Action Provision, 17 U. MicH. J.L.
REF. 25 (1983); see also Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979);
Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974); Lynch
v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-77
(1974).
69. 417 U.S. at 173 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23 notes of advisory committee on
rules-1966 amendment).
70. Id. at 175.
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However, courts have continued to hold that notice by publica-
tion satisfies due process in 23(b)(1) and (2) actions. 1
Because Rule 23(c)(2) only expressly applies to actions cer-
tified under 23(b)(3), courts have deliberated whether the notice
requirement applies in 23(b)(1) and (2) class actions. The Sec-
ond Circuit, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," implied that a
strict notice requirement similar to that imposed in 23(b)(3) ac-
tions is mandated by the Constitution and should be applied to
all class actions.1 In affirming the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court did not consider whether strict notice standards applied
to 23(b)(1) and (2) actions . 4 However, a year later in Sosna v.
Iowa,"5 the Supreme Court cryptically established that the no-
tice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) and Eisen did not apply to
(b)(1) and (2) actions. 76 Since then, the majority of courts have
rejected the suggestion that notice is required in 23(b)(1) and (2)
actions." While some courts have implied that notice is consti-
71. See, e.g., Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1979)
(court approved notice posted on an employee bulletin board in 23(b)(2) action even
where the names and addresses of the class members were available).
72. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), a f'd, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
73. In Eisen, the plaintiff attempted to certify the class under all three provisions of
Rule 23. 391 F.2d at 564. Consequently, the issue of notice arose not only under 23(c)(2)
but also under the provisions of 23(d)(2). The Second Circuit implied that the discre-
tionary language of 23(d)(2) was intended by the drafters of the rules to ensure the best
practicable notice would be provided in 23(b)(1) and (2) actions. "The Advisory Commit-
tee in its note has suggested that the mandatory notice pursuant to 23(c)(2) and the
discretionary notice under 23(d)(2) were intended to fulfill the requirements of due pro-
cess established by Hansberry and Mullane." Id. at 568 (footnotes and citations
omitted).
74. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 175-77. By the time Eisen was reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the 23(b)(1) and (2) claims had been dismissed from the action. Thus, the Court
was only required to address the notice required by 23(c)(2) for 23(b)(3) actions. The
Court specifically limited its holding to 23(c)(2). Id. at 177 n.14.
75. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
76. Id. at 397 n.4 ("the [notice] problems associated with a Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tion, which were considered by the Court last Term in [Eisen], are not present in this
case [filed under 23(b)(2)]").
77. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798, 812 (5th Cir.) (court
ordered notice in 23(b)(2) action was discretionary and not required), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1038 (1982); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1980) ("the class sought
only injunctive relief and was certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which does not require that
notice be given to class members"); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1022 (5th Cir. 1979)
("If the class is only a 23(b)(2) class, it was not absolutely necessary to notify every
member of the class who could be identified through reasonable effort."); Alexander v.
Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1374 (6th Cir. 1977) ("We agree with the Advisory
Committee that prejudgment notice of a (b)(2) class suit need not in all cases be sent to
absent class members to comply with the requirements of due process."); Elliott v. Wein-
berger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1229 n.14 (9th Cir. 1977) ("in (b)(2) actions absent members, re-
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tutionally required under (b) (1) and (2) where monetary relief is
requested,78 even this position has been modified.79
The rationale for the different notice requirements under
the various types of class actions is rooted in the theories behind
these actions and is based on several assumptions about the re-
lationship that exists between class members under the various
types of actions. The first assumption is that actions pursuant to
23(b)(1) and (2) involve close relationships among the class
members because of the nature of the relief usually sought. Class
members in a (b)(1) action are assumed to have a close relation-
ship to one another because of the requirement of some juridical
tie existing between them before the action is filed or because
they are claiming from a common fund.80 Likewise, as a result of
gardless whether they receive notice or not, cannot excuse themselves from the litigation
or avoid res judicata effects of the judgment entered therein"), modified, 442 U.S. 682
(1979); Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1185-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("the factors
that have prompted courts and commentators to conclude that due process does not
require notice in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are equally applicable to actions certified
under Rule 23(b)(1)"), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749,
764 (2d Cir. 1975) ("notice is not required in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 'injunctive relief'
class action").
78. King v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 790 F.2d 524, 529-30 (6th Cir. 1986);
Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975).
79. See Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1979). The
court in Johnson implied that individual notice to identified class members may not be
necessary even when monetary relief is sought but held that "some form of notice" is
necessary before individual damages actions are barred by res judicata. Id.
[When] individual monetary claims are at stake, the balance swings in favor of
the provision of some form of notice. It will not always be necessary for the
notice in such cases to be equivalent to that required in (b)(3) actions....
Before an absent class member may be barred from pursuing an individual
damage claim, however, due process requires that he receive some form of no-
tice that the class action is pending and that his damage claims may be adjudi-
cated as part of it.
Id. at 438 (citations omitted).
80. Rule 23(b)(1) class actions are appropriate when separate actions "would estab-
lish incompatible standards of conduct" or "would as a practical matter be dispositive of
the interests of [absent class members] or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). Although the stare decisis effects of
separate actions arguably meet these requirements, courts have refused to certify a
23(b)(1) class on the basis of the stare decisis effects alone. Because all actions could be
certifiable under Rule 23(b)(1) if an adverse stare decisis impact were enough to satisfy
23(b)(1)'s requirements, courts have required more than possible stare decisis effects.
See, e.g., In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1987);
Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1181 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976), afl'd, 431 U.S. 864
(1977); United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10, 17 n.5 (D. Nev.
1975).
However, actions have been certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) when stare decisis
"would establish incompatible standards of conduct" and the court also finds a "juridical
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the injunctive nature of (b)(2) actions, the assumption is that
very little expected divergence exists between the interests of
the various class members.81 Because of the assumed homogene-
ous interests of the class members in (b)(1) and (2) actions, no-
tice has been held unnecessary to protect the due process rights
of absent members so long as representation is adequate.8 2 Even
in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, courts have interpreted the notice func-
tion as merely supportive of the "opt out" provisions-the latter
being the primary due process protection."3
The approach in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
8 4
is typical of the notice analysis. Wetzel involved a Title VII ac-
tion certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The court held that notice to
absent members of the plaintiff class was not required.
The very nature of a (b)(2) class is that it is homogenous with-
link'-a legal relationship between class members that existed before the litigation
arose. See In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 120-21, 125 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (juridical tie
existed because the class of defendant underwriters were already codefendants in a simi-
lar class action, and class certified under 23(b)(1)(A)); Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist.,
71 F.R.D. at 15, 17 (class certified under 23(b)(1)(A) when "all of the [water] certificate
holders derive[d] their rights from a common source of supply"); see also Comment,
supra note 3, at 1394-95 & nn.170-74 (providing examples of juridical ties); cf. Research
Corp. v. Pfister Assoc'd Growers Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (juridical tie
existed between class of defendants who used the same process to produce hybrid seed
corn), appeal dismissed sub noma. Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1970); In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 901 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("[A]n important legal relationship [juridical link] justifying
class treatment in this case is that each defendant is united in a chain of privity that has
allowed them to introduce the Dalkon Shield into the stream of commerce."), modified,
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
Class actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) when a limited fund for recovery
would cause separate actions to "be dispositive of the interests of [absent class members]
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." See In re
Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1984) (certification under
23(b)(1)(B) is proper when plaintiffs will be compensated from a limited fund); Alexan-
der Grant & Co. v. McAlister, 116 F.R.D. 583, 590 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (certification under
23(b)(1)(B) because the common insurance fund was inadequate to fully protect all
members of the defendant class).
81. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 255-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 notes of advisory committee on rules-1966
amendment.
82. Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1981);
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
83. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.
1974); Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), app. dismissed, 443 F. 2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972).
84. 508 F.2d at 239.
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out any conflicting interests between the members of the class.
Since the class is cohesive, its members would be bound either
by the collateral estoppel or the stare decisis effect of a suit
brought by an individual plaintiff. Thus, as long as the repre-
sentation is adequate and faithful, there is no unfairness in giv-
ing res judicata effect to a judgment against all members of the
class even if they have not received notice. Adequacy of repre-
sentation of the class is a mandatory requirement for the main-
tenance of a class action under Rule 23(a). If the representa-
tion proves inadequate, members of the class would not be
bound.85
Although the rules governing notice in 23(b)(1) and (2) class
actions have developed largely in the context of plaintiff class
actions, little divergence from the standard analysis has oc-
curred when the rules are applied to defendant class actions.86
Some courts have recognized fairness requires that defendant
class members receive notice of a pending (b)(1) or (2) action
and have exercised their discretion to require such notice.
7
Other courts have held that expediency in vindicating the plain-
tiffs' rights outweighs any interest an absent defendant might
have in.receiving notice.88
Two assumptions are implicit in the homogeneity argument
against notice: 1) an adequate representative can be expected to
raise and litigate all defenses in a manner substantially similar
to every other defendant in the suit; and 2) because of the na-
ture of the action, each defendant has the same stake in the out-
come of the controversy. If these assumptions are valid the addi-
tional participation of absent defendants would be redundant.
The validity of the assumptions is questionable, however, in the
context of a defendant class action.
First, a plaintiff class member's interest in enjoining some-
one else and limiting their actions is very different from the in-
terest of a defendant whose actions stand to be limited." Courts
85. Id. at 256.
86. Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1065-68 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (three-judge
court) (certifying a defendant class and holding that prejudgment notice was not re-
quired), af'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (declining to reach notice issue); Lake v. Speziale, 580
F. Supp. 1318, 1334 (D. Conn. 1984); Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D. 64, 69 (E.D.
Wis. 1981); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 n.3 (D. Conn. 1973)
(three-judge court).
87. See, e.g., Lynch Corp. v. MI Liquidating Co., 82 F.R.D. 478 (D.S.D. 1979).
88. See, e.g., Leist, 91 F.R.D. at 64.
89. Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
An unnamed member of a plaintiff class generally stands to gain from the liti-
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have consistently recognized and protected the peculiar right of
a defendant to control the course of litigation that may bind
that defendant.90 As recently as the decision in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court has recognized the inher-
ent difference between plaintiff class members losing a chose in
action upon which they may never have acted and defendant
class members being affirmatively bound by a judgment. 1 Ab-
sent defendants bound by a class action judgment have been
held directly liable and forced to pay compensation or respond
to an injunction without ever participating in the litigation. Al-
though absent plaintiffs may lose a chose in action as a result of
an adverse class action judgment, they do not suffer direct liabil-
ity. An absent plaintiff does not incur an out of pocket loss and
is not required to undertake or desist from particular action.
The homogeneity argument does not account for this defense
interest.
Second, the assumption that the interests of class members
will be homogeneous does not account for the varying stake each
defendant may have in the outcome of the litigation or in the
conduct or management of the litigation. For example, in In re
Gap Stores Securities Litigation92 the potential individual lia-
bility of the class members ranged from $42,000 to over $1 mil-
gation in which a plaintiff class is certified; all that is risked is the right to later
bring a cause of action in his own name. An unnamed member of a defendant
class, however, 'stands to lose' without having had the opportunity to person-
ally defend against the lawsuit.
Id. at 507 (quoting Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668, 674
(N.D. Ill. 1983); see also, Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 81 F.R.D. 487, 489 (W.D.
Pa. 1979) ("[W]hen one is an unnamed member of a plaintiff class one generally stands
to gain from the litigation.... However, when one is an unnamed member of a defend-
ant class, one may be required to pay a judgment without having had the opportunity to
personally defend the suit.").
90. The fundamental policy concerns underlying personal jurisdiction and choice of
law rules revolve, in part, around fairness to defendants. The limits on choice of law are
generally imposed for the purpose of preventing "forum shopping, unfairness to defend-
ants, and interference with other states' sovereignty." Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96
YALE L.J. 1, 57 (1986) (emphasis added); see infra notes 117-42 and accompanying text.
Moreover, most formulations of the standards for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
focus on the fairness of forcing a defendant to defend a lawsuit in a given jurisdiction.
See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. Other procedural devices also serve in
part to protect this defense right such as venue limitations and the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.
91. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1985).
92. 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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lion . 3 In Richardson v. Kelly,94 the financial stake of the de-
fendants ranged from $18 to over $16,000. 95 Moreover, the
absent defendant may have procedural or jurisdictional defenses
such as improper venue or lack of personal jurisdiction not avail-
able to the representative defendant. Choice of law problems
may vary depending on which class member is the named repre-
sentative.9 6 Such basic defenses may vary from defendant to de-
fendant no matter whether the representative is diligent or sub-
stantively adequate and regardless of the type of action.
Third, a defendant will not be affected by the stare decisis
or res judicata effect of a non-class judgment in the same way a
plaintiff would be affected. The potential stare decisis effect of a
judgment alone rarely forms the justification for class treat-
ment."' More importantly, stare decisis only governs the out-
come of cases within the limits of a jurisdiction. Courts outside
the jurisdiction where the original judgment was obtained, in lit-
igation involving different parties, are not bound by the disposi-
tion of the original case. Although courts may find precedent
from other jurisdictions persuasive, potential defendants outside
the jurisdictional boundaries of a court are simply not bound by
stare decisis, while those potential defendants inside the juris-
diction are bound. Furthermore, the ability of a plaintiff to af-
firmatively assert the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment
against a defendant who was not a party to the action in which
the original judgment was obtained is limited. Offensive, non-
mutual assertions of collateral estoppel are strictly limited to the
issues fully and fairly litigated in the first action. 8 To the extent
the new defendant has unique defenses of venue, jurisdiction
and choice of law, litigation could not be estopped. Thus, the
homogeneity assumptions justifying the lack of notice in
23(b)(1) and (2) plaintiff class actions simply do not hold up in
defendant class actions.
The major notice protection afforded absent (b)(1) and (2)
defendants under the Federal Rules is found in Rule 23(d),
which gives courts discretion to issue orders to protect absent
93. Id. at 303.
94. 144 Tex. 497, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945).
95. Id. at 516-17, 191 S.W.2d at 868 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting).
96. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985); Miller & Crump,
supra note 90, at 64-66.
97. See supra note 80.
98. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979).
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members of the class.99 However, because of the discretionary
nature of the provision, notice is not guaranteed as a prerequi-
site to judgment. Courts have exercised their discretion under
23(d) for varying reasons. The provision has been used most
often as a check that other class action requirements such as
adequate representation and numerousity have been met; notice
is sent to provide absent members the opportunity to appear
and provide input regarding the requirements of the rule.10
C. Intervention and Opting Out
Even if an absent member of a defendant class under
23(b)(1) or (2) receives notice of the pending action, such a de-
fendant has few available options. Rule 23(c)(2) does not allow
absent defendants in 23(b)(1) or (2) actions to opt out of the
class. 10' Thus, assuming that the other requirements of Rule 23
have been met, the judgment in a (b)(1) or (2) action will be res
judicata as to any person falling within the defined class. 02 The
rationale for prohibiting a class member from opting out of a
(b)(1) or (2) class action apparently is that such an occurrence
would destroy the utility of such actions.0 3 With respect to a
defendant class action, an additional concern exists which is
summarized by one judge's observation: "What member of a
class of defendants who is in his right mind, and who is told
99. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
100. Lynch Corp. v. MU Liquidating Co., 82 F.R.D. 478 (D.S.D. 1979). In Wetzel V.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975), the
court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require notice in a (b)(2) action stat-
ing: "We will not presume to exercise supervisory powers ... to mandate notice which
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme Court under author-
ity from Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, specifically do not require." Id.
101. Rule 23(c)(2) states:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances .... The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will ex-
clude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the right to opt out of the class is lim-
ited to 23(b)(3) class actions.
102. Rule 23(c)(3) states: "The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(3).
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 notes of advisory committee on rules--1966 amendments.
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that, if he does not elect to be excluded he may be liable.
will fail to opt out?"'
10 4
Despite the inability of an absent 23(b)(1) or (2) defendant
to escape the web of the class action judgment, such a defendant
is not guaranteed the ability to intervene actively in the conduct
of the litigation. Rule 23(d)(2) gives the court discretion to per-
mit intervention "for the protection of the members of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action."'105 Most courts
interpreting the intervention language in Rule 23 have held that
the language must be applied consistently with the Rule 24 in-
tervention requirements."0 Rule 24 intervention of right is only
available where the would-be intervenor meets the requirements
of Rule 24(a). The problem occurs because Rule 24(a) provides a
caveat to intervention of right when the "applicant's interest is
adequately represented by interested parties.' 0 7 Thus, to the
extent that the court has certified the class and explicitly found
the named representatives adequately represent the absent par-
ties, intervention of right would seem to be precluded. This re-
sult was reached in Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co.,'0 s a plaintiff
'class action where absent parties sought to intervene under Rule
24(a). The court refused to permit intervention of right, stating:
"Assuming, without deciding, that appellants fulfill all other re-
quirements of Rule 24(a), we find that they are not entitled to
intervene as a matter of right since their interests are adequately
represented by the state."' 09 Thus, under Rule 24, a court must
104. Kline v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
106. Rule 24 provides in relevant part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the'action and
the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or fact in common.
FED. R, CIv. P. 24. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Arata, 406 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 24; see supra note 106.
108. 470 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
109. Id. at 1278; see also Gabriel v. Standard Fruit & Steamship Co., 448 F.2d 724
(5th Cir. 1971).
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deny intervention once it has made a finding that representation
is adequate. No other result is permitted.
As a general rule, permissive intervention may be allowed
when the court finds intervention would enhance the representa-
tion of the class. Some courts have held that permissive inter-
vention of an absent class action plaintiff is available where the
representation of the absent class member seeking intervention
is "inherently inadequate" or where the absent class member's
interests would not be fully represented by the class representa-
tives.110 Such holdings are inexplicable given the requirements of
Rules 23 and 24. To the extent the named representative is "in-
herently inadequate" or does not fully represent the class, two
conclusions can be reached under the current rules, neither of
which justify intervention. Either the class should not have been
certified because the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) that the rep-
resentative be adequate was not met, or the potential intervenor
is not a member of the certified class because the intervenor's
interests are not common and he or she will not be bound by the
judgment. Courts recognizing this anomaly have denied permis-
sive intervention by absent class members because the presence
of additional parties whose interests are common with the class
representative would unnecessarily delay the litigation. For ex-
ample, in Stenson v. Blum,"" the court emphasized:
where a suit has been designated a class action, admitting in-
tervenors who raise no new issues and who fall within the class
merely clutters the action unnecessarily." . . . [G]ranting such
a motion "would mean that any member of the class, ipso
facto, has a right to intervene and litigate the action fully.
Such a construction would render class actions just as unman-
ageable as some are wont to fear them." 2
Although the issue has never been litigated in a reported case,
presumably the same general approach would be applied to in-
tervention in defendant class actions." 3 In any event, interven-
110. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
111. 476 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afl'd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 885 (1980).
112. Id. at 1336 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186,
196 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)). The court did note, however, that "[s]ome courts have permitted
intervention in class actions when applicants raised the same issues as the named plain-
tiffs on the ground that it makes little difference whether intervention is permitted or
denied." Id. at n.10 (citing Groves v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 433 F. Supp. 877, 888
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. La. 1970)).
113. See 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
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tion has not been permitted solely for the purpose of allowing
participation by absent defendants in the litigation.
Moreover, when permissive intervention is allowed, it is
only at the expense of such defenses as personal jurisdiction and
venue.114 The intervening class member is held to the court's ex-
ercise of jurisdiction even though, but for the class action, such
defenses would be available. This situation is distinguishable
from permissive intervention in a non-class setting where the
would-be intervenor will not necessarily be bound by the judg-
ment if the attempt at intervention is unsuccessful.1 5 The class
action defendant must either attempt to intervene (waiving ju-
risdiction and venue) or risk a binding judgment anyway with-
out participating in the litigation.
In summary, if consistently applied as currently formulated,
intervention does not provide a feasible procedure for protecting
the interests of absent defendant class members. Absent defend-
ants must look to other methods of assuring due process.
D. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Choice of Law
In addition to the possibility that judgment could be en-
tered against absent class action defendants without sufficient
representation, without notice of the pendency of the action,
and without an opportunity to intervene, absent members of a
defendant class may be subjected to the incorrect law by a court
which lacks .personal jurisdiction and venue over the absent
defendants.
1799 (1986). Certainly if a class is certified as to some issues and not as to others, the
class members will be able to appear and defend as to non-class issues.
114. See 7A Id. § 1757 ("Of course, if a non-party defendant class member inter-
vened under Rule 12(h)(1) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] he waived any ob-
jections he might have had to the court's exercise of complete personal jurisdiction over
him."); cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, 71 F.R.D. 391 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (intervenor
waives privilege of challenging venue); TWA v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 339 F.2d 56 (2d
Cir. 1964) (intervenor may not object to venue), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 842 (1965). In
fact, in United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976), the court
refused to excuse absent members of a defendant class action from the class even though
venue was improper as to those class members. The court reasoned that "the relevant
venue question [in a defendant class action] is whether venue is proper as among the
parties who have in fact been brought personally before the court as named parties to
the action . . . ." Id. at 100.
115. The unsuccessful intervenor may be affected by an adverse judgment as a re-
sult of stare decisis.
116. Permitting intervention by absent defendants while protecting the interests of
those defendants would not constitute an adequate resolution of the problem. See infra
text accompanying note 180.
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1. In personam jurisdiction
The class action device has been held out as the major ex-
ception to the requirement that a court obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over the parties before it. 117 Whether and to what extent
personal jurisdiction applies, or has constitutional content in the
federal system, is the subject of considerable debate." 8 In state
court litigation, the requirements of personal jurisdiction usually
ensure that before a court exercises its power over a defendant,
117. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 99 (D.D.C. 1976).
118. For differing views of commentators, see Abraham, Constitutional Limitation
Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 V-L. L. REV. 520, 536 (1963) ("There
is no clear reason why the 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' embod-
ied in the Fifth Amendment should not also encompass some measure of protection
against inconvenient litigation, even though the protection is not identical to that af-
forded by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction
and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CoRNELL L. REV. 411, 427-28 (1981) (argu-
ing that personal jurisdiction in the form of reasonableness and fairness requirements is
applied in the federal system as a doctrine of self restraint that may not have constitu-
tional content); Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1984) ("Although the fourteenth
amendment is inapplicable to the federal government, a litigant in federal court defend-
ing a federal question claim should be able to assert the same constitutional protection
against litigation in an inconvenient forum as he can in state court."); Stephens, The
Federal Court Across the Street: Constitutional Limits on Federal Court Assertions of
Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 697, 719-22 (1984) (advocating the adoption of
a forum reasonableness test in the federal system that would consider forum contacts
and efficiency concerns as well as fairness to the defendant).
The courts are divided as well. Compare Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156-57 (1st
Cir. 1978) (limits of territorial jurisdiction are within congressional discretion), rev'd on
other grounds sub. nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980), with Oxford First Corp.
v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-204 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (a fifth amendment
fairness standard limits service of process under federal statutes such as the Securities
Act).
Federal courts have recognized nationwide jurisdiction in federal question cases
where Congress has provided for such jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d
1138 (2d Cir. 1974). However, no general standard of nationwide jurisdiction has been
recognized. Some rationale exists for a different federal approach to personal jurisdic-
tion. Certainly concerns of state sovereignty are not at issue when a federal court exer-
cises federal question jurisdiction over private parties. Sovereignty concerns which have
played a role in the analysis of state court exercise of jurisdiction might not affect the
question of a federal court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction. See World-Wide Volk-
swagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) ("[The concept of minimum con-
tacts] acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal system."). In
addition, as a national court system, the federal courts may have some duty to provide a
forum for litigation which might not exist because of personal jurisdictional concerns of
state courts. However, the fairness concerns do not appreciably change when the forum
is federal rather than state. One commentator has even suggested that some federal stat-
utes conferring nationwide jurisdiction are unconstitutional because of the fairness con-
cerns. Fullerton, supra, at 5-6.
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that defendant must have had minimum contacts with the
forum.1
19
As the doctrine has developed, personal jurisdiction has
come to involve not only an inquiry into the territorial power of
the sovereign, but also the protection of the defendant's individ-
ual due process interests in avoiding unduly burdensome litiga-
tion in a distant forum. 120 The concept of minimum contacts was
formulated, in part, to protect the due process rights of defend-
ants and refers to "the quality and nature of the [defendant's]
activity [in the forum jurisdiction] in relation to the fair and or-
derly administration of the laws.' 121 Recently, the Supreme
Court, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,122 considered
whether a court must obtain personal jurisdiction over absent
members of a plaintiff class action. In reaching its decision that
personal jurisdiction was not necessary, the Court explained that
the purpose of the minimum contacts test is "to protect a de-
fendant from the travail of defending in a distant forum unless
the defendant's contacts with the forum make it just to force
him to defend there.' 23 The Court in Shutts and in its other
personal jurisdiction decisions has emphasized that the question
is whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the
privileges of the forum state such that he could reasonably an-
ticipate the possibility of being sued there. 24 In Insurance Corp.
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,25 the Court
underscored the individual rights aspect of personal jurisdiction
when it explained: "The personal jurisdiction requirement recog-
nizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but
as a matter of individual liberty.' 1 26 Furthermore, the Court
119. This concept has been developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny. International Shoe dealt with the power of a state
court to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.
120. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067 (2d ed.
1985).
121. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-07 (1985) (quoting Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
122. 472 U.S. at 797.
123. Id. at 807.
124. Id; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
125. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
126. Id. at 702. In the footnote accompanying this text, the Court explained: "The
restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagon Corp., how-
ever, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
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concluded that the contacts which give rise to jurisdiction must
be the result of the defendant's conduct and not the unilateral
acts of the plaintiff. 127 These concerns with the fairness to de-
fendants, so pervasive in the law of personal jurisdiction, do not
disappear when the forum is federal court rather than state
court.2
On the surface, the commonly stated policies of personal ju-
risdiction appear to be served if a court in a defendant class ac-
tion obtains jurisdiction over only the named defendants. Since
only the named parties are actually required to appear and de-
fend, no due process burden is placed on the absent parties.
Thus, arguably, the plaintiff's interest in effective relief and the
judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of controversy
should prevail and personal jurisdiction and venue should be re-
quired only for the named defendants.
129
Closer analysis indicates the fallacies of this reasoning. The
absent defendant may eVentually be subjected to the remedial
power of the court if judgment is entered against the class. That
judgment could consist of onerous injunctive relief or monetary
relief in the form of damages or restitution.3 0 Although the class
representative may litigate the substantive issues for the absent
parties, the class representative cannot respond to the judgment
on behalf of those parties. Even before judgment, an absent de-
fendant could be forced to respond to discovery in the distant
forum.' 31 The only ways for defendants to protect themselves
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 702-03 n.10 (citing World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)).
127. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474-75; World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at
297; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253.
128. See Miller & Crump, supra note 90, at 29-31 and materials cited therein.
Professors Miller and Crump conclude that "[t]he disadvantages of distant forum abuse
are not mitigated by the forum's federal rather than state character." Id. at 31.
129. Although few courts have addressed the issue, this seems to be the common
resolution of the problem. See, e.g., United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D.
98, 99-100 (D.D.C. 1976) ("The class action thus stands as the outstanding exception to
the general rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in litigation to which
he/she has not been made a party by service of process."); Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex.
497, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945) (majority bound defendants to personal liability without in
personam jurisdiction); Parsons & Starr, supra note 4, at 889 ("in personam jurisdiction
over all class members is not mandatory").
130. Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975).
131. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978):
While it is true that discovery against absentee class members under Rules 33
and 34 cannot be had as a matter of course, the overwhelming majority of
courts which have considered the scope of discovery against absentees have
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against such actions are by either opting out of the class (which
is not available in (b)(1) and (2) actions) or intervening. The
price of intervention, when permitted, is the waiver of lack of
personal jurisdiction.3 2 Such hapless defendants must travel to
a distant forum, where they did not either reasonably anticipate
litigating or purposefully avail themselves of privileges. A unilat-
eral act of the plaintiff in bringing the action should not be per-
mitted to subject such defendants to jurisdiction.
2. Venue
In addition to the fairness concerns raised by the failure to
obtain personal jurisdiction over absent members of a defendant
class, the failure to obtain complete venue over absent defend-
ant class members may also raise constitutional concerns. 133 Al-
though venue is most commonly viewed as an administrative ve-
hicle to allocate the business of the federal courts, both courts
and commentators have recognized that venue also acts to pro-
tect individual liberty interests of defendants. 3 4 Some of the
concerns behind venue are the same as those behind personal
jurisdiction, that is, protecting parties from unreasonable or fun-
damentally unfair exercises of judicial power. 35 Professor Cler-
mont has characterized this requirement, comprised of both
traditional venue and personal jurisdiction concerns, as "forum
reasonableness.
''1 s3
3. Choice of law
Choice of law questions also raise due process concerns in
the context of defendant class actions. The unique constitutional
concluded that such discovery is available, at least when the information re-
quested is relevant to the decision of common questions, when the interrogato-
ries or document requests are tendered in good faith and are not unduly bur-
densome, and when the information is not available from the representative
parties.
Id. at 187; see also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1971); M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 103
F.R.D. 635 (D. Mass. 1984).
132. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
133. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 100 (D.D.C. 1976).
134. See, e.g., Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 167 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1021 (1984); Clermont, supra note 118, at 411.
135. This comparison has led some scholars to suggest that personal jurisdiction
concerns should be subsumed into a venue inquiry in federal litigation. See Clermont,
supra note 118, at 435 n.117, 437-41.
136. Id. at 437.
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problems with choice of law in defendant class actions arise be-
cause, in some instances, no party to the class litigation will be
in a position to raise and litigate the choice of law issues availa-
ble to absent class members.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,'13 the Court reasoned
that, "for a state's substantive law to be selected in a constitu-
tionally permissible manner, that state must have a significant
contact or aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that the choice of law is neither arbitrary or unfair."'13 8 Later in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, a plaintiff class action, the
Court relied on Allstate and held that the Kansas court imper-
missibly applied Kansas law to the disposition of claims of ab-
sent plaintiff class members who had no connection with Kan-
sas.139 The Court reasoned:
When considering fairness in this context, an important ele-
ment is the expectation of the parties .... There is no indica-
tion that ... the parties had any idea that Kansas law would
control. Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires Kansas "to substitute for its own [laws],
applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting stat-
ute of another state," . . . but Kansas "may not abrogate the
rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to any-
thing done or to be done within them."" °
In Shutts, the party opposing the class, the defendant, was
allowed to raise and litigate the choice of law question.' Since
the different law which could have applied in Shutts signifi-
cantly reduced the defendant's liability, it had a strong motive
to press the issue. Usually, such a motive will be lacking in a
defendant class action. For example, when federal courts must
borrow state statutes of limitations, individual choice of law
questions arise.'42 In such cases, the plaintiffs have presumably
137. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). For general discussions of the constitutional ramifications
of choice of law questions, see Shreve, Interest Analysis as Constitutional Law, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 51 (1987); Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limita-
tions, 59 COLO. L. REv. 9 (1988).
138. Allstate, 449 U. S. at 312-13.
139. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985).
140. Id. at 822 (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939) and Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930)).
141. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 803-06.
142. For example, courts regularly borrow a state statute of limitations under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1988). For a general discussion of
the inconsistencies that result from federal borrowing of state statute of limitations, see
Comment, A Functional Approach to Borrowing Limitations Periods for Federal Stat-
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selected a forum favorable to pursuing their claims and defend-
ant class representatives who cannot raise (or will not benefit
from raising) adverse choice of law issues. Unlike the defendant
in Shutts, who had a motive to argue the choice of law issue
because its liability to individual members of the plaintiff class
depended on which state law applied, the named defendant
would not typically have this same motive in the example above.
The same statute of limitations will apply to the named defend-
ant in the example no matter which state's law applies to the
claims of the absent members of the defendant class. Conse-
quently, the possibility of applying a forum law in violation of
the due process interests of the absent members of the defend-
ant class arises.
III. RULE 82
The certification of defendant class actions against absent
defendants who could not be brought within the jurisdiction and
venue of the federal court violates Rule 82 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Although the scope and application of Rule
82 have not been well defined, Rule 82 was intended to address
and resolve the type of jurisdictional problems that arise in de-
fendant class actions.
Rule 82 states: "These rules shall not be construed to ex-
tend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts
or the venue of actions therein.' 143 The Advisory Committee for
the original draft of the rule recognized that the broadened pro-
cedural devices for pursuing multiple party actions were not in-
tended to extend federal jurisdiction. The Notes of the Advisory
Committee provide: "These rules grant extensive power of join-
ing claims and counterclaims in one action, but, as this rule [82]
states, such grant does not extend federal jurisdiction.'
1 44
Rule 82 does not appear to express limitations required by
the Rules Enabling Act 45 or place any limit on the court's abil-
utes, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 133 (1989).
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 notes of advisory committee on rules.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The Rules Enabling Act authorized the Supreme Court
to "prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and
the practice and procedure [of the Federal Courts]." This grant of rule-making power is
subject to Congressional veto. In addition, section 2072 provides: "Such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. .. ."
See generally Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction,
28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 431-43 (1976). Professor Goldberg, in discussing whether Rule 82
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ity to interpret, reconsider, and expand jurisdictional tests such
a minimum contacts. Rather, Rule 82 is a limitation on the
courts' ability to indirectly expand jurisdiction by inferring such
jurisdictional expansion from a particular interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 146 Rule 82 does express a pol-
icy that expansion of jurisdiction take place with direct refer-
ence to jurisdictional tests and policies rather than through the
indirect method of interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The most direct applications of Rule 82 have arisen in the
class action area, in Snyder v. Harris1 47 and Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co.1 48 Snyder and Zahn both involved the interac-
tion between Rule 23 and the then existing jurisdictional
amount requirement for diversity jurisdiction. In Snyder, the
Court refused to permit aggregation of the class members'
claims to obtain jurisdiction. The Court suggested that such a
change in the interpretation of the "matter in controversy m 49
could not be inferred from Rule 23 because of the limits of Rule
82.150 The class action rule was not intended to directly expand
subject matter jurisdiction, and, pursuant to Rule 82, the Court
was proscribed from interpreting the class action rule to have
the effect of expanding subject matter jurisdiction. Likewise, in
Zahn the Court relied on the same reasoning as Snyder to hold
that every class member must have claims totalling more than
the jurisdictional amount.1 5'
In contrast, Professor Moore asserts that the word "jurisdic-
tion" in Rule 82 refers to subject matter jurisdiction but not to
constitutes a limitation on the rule-making authority of the courts, points out that the
Supreme Court has held that rules affecting jurisdiction are permissible under the Rules
Enabling Act. See, e.g., Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
146. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 145, at 441-43. Goldberg suggests that Rule 82 should
be interpreted as a rule of judicial self-restraint which should only be applied when the
effect on jurisdiction of the federal rules does not have an independent procedural justi-
fication. In contrast to the position expressed in this article, Goldberg would therefore
permit indirect expansions of jurisdiction through the federal rules except where there is
no procedural justification for the rule and it is a mere pretext for jurisdictional change.
147. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
148. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). A court may exercise diversity jurisdiction only "where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000." Id.
150. 394 U.S. at 341 ("Nor can we overlook the fact that the Congress that permit-
ted the Federal Rules to go into effect was assured before doing so that none of the Rules
would either expand or contract the jurisdiction of federal courts.").
151. 414 U.S. at 296-301.
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personal jurisdiction. 152 His argument is based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree.'
5 3
In Murphree, the Court held that the provisions of Rule 4(f)
which extended the territorial limits for service of process did
not violate the Rules Enabling Act's limitation that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure could not "abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.' 1 54 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
reasoned that Rule 82 applied to subject matter jurisdiction and
venue, and that Rule 4 and Rule 82 must be construed together
with respect to personal jurisdiction. In the context of its consid-
eration, the Court stated that "the Advisory Committee ... has
treated Rule 82 as referring to . . . [subject matter jurisdiction
and venue] rather than the means of bringing the defendant
before the court . . . .
This reasoning, that Rule 82 does not apply to personal ju-
risdiction, seems flawed. First, it is possible to read Rule 4 and
Rule 82 together and still hold that Rule 82 refers to personal
jurisdiction. Rule 82 is not a limitation on the rule-making
power of the court.156 Its language does not track the substance/
procedure distinction set forth in the Rules Enabling Act. Thus,
Rule 82 is not a limit on the court's ability to interpret and
modify its own approach to jurisdiction. 57 Instead, Rule 82
seems to express a preference that such interpretations and
modifications of jurisdiction be accomplished with direct refer-
ence to jurisdictional policies and doctrines and not through in-
ference from the existence of certain non-jurisdictional provi-
sions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
152. 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 82.02 (2d ed. 1990).
153. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
155. 326 U.S. at 445.
156. The question of whether Rule 82 is required by the Rules Enabling Act is still
open. The most thorough and thoughtful treatment of the subject is Professor
Goldberg's article. See Goldberg, supra note 145, at 432-37. She reviews the inconclusive
history of both Rule 82 and the Enabling Act. Finding little help there, she reasons that,
if the question of subject matter jurisdiction is procedural in nature, Rule 82 is not re-
quired by the Enabling Act since the Act only precludes the Court from adopting rules
that are substantive. Goldberg analyzes all the tests for distinguishing substance from
procedure and concludes that under each of them the question of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is procedural in nature. Consequently, she concludes that Rule 82 is not required by
the Enabling Act.
157. For example, the Court's activity in the areas of ancillary and pendant jurisdic-
tion stands as evidence that the Rules do not constitute an affirmative limitation on the
Court's ability to reinterpret jurisdictional tests. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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These policies of restraint and direct consideration of juris-
dictional tests have influence in the area of defendant class ac-
tions. They mean either that a class action can be maintained
only against defendants over whom the court could exercise ju-
risdiction and venue in a non-class action suit or that, in order
to maintain such a class action, consideration must be given di-
rectly to the jurisdictional and venue tests and the tests must be
evaluated on their own merits. Jurisdictional expansion cannot
be an indirect side effect of class certification. This is especially
true when the troubling aspects of defendant class actions are
considered. As defendant class actions are presently being certi-
fied, plaintiffs are able to sue absent members of a defendant
class whom they could not sue outside the class action context
because either personal jurisdiction or venue would be im-
proper. 15 8 Permitting an action to be maintained under the class
action rule when an individual action could not be maintained
results in a broadening of the tests for jurisdiction and venue.1 59
Actions are maintained against defendants who did not have
minimum contacts with the jurisdiction, and they are main-
tained in jurisdictions where neither all plaintiffs nor all defend-
ants reside. These actions are being maintained without any ref-
erence to the underlying policies behind the jurisdiction and
venue limitations that are being broadened, but instead are cer-
tified with sole reference to the provisions of the class action
rule. The actions are supported by policies and doctrine regard-
ing the utility of class actions rather than by consideration of
the policies and doctrine which govern expansion of jurisdiction.
This result seems exactly the situation that Rule 82 was in-
tended to prohibit.
IV. JUDICIAL LIMITATION OF DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
The difficulties in protecting the rights of absent class de-
158. One court has held that Rule 82 precludes maintenance of a class action where
venue was improper as to absent members of the class. See Sperberg v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 61 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ohio 1973). However, most courts have concluded that
neither venue nor personal jurisdiction need be obtained over absent members of a de-
fendant class. See United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 100 (D.D.C.
1976) (venue not required for absent defendant class members) and cases cited therein;
supra note 129 (cases and commentators suggesting that personal jurisdiction is not re-
quired over absent defendant class members).
159. Contra Trucking Employers, 72 F.R.D. at 100 (failing to obtain venue over
absent members of a defendant class does not violate Rule 82 because the issue was
settled prior to the adoption of the federal rules).
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fendants have not gone unnoticed by the courts. Recently, the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have severely
limited the applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) to defendant classes. 1
60
These circuits have effectively restricted the number of defend-
ant actions being certified since most defendant classes are certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2) because of the limited applicability of
Rule 23(b)(1)16' and the problems with the "opt out" provisions
accompanying Rule 23(b)(3).162
The courts limiting the applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) have
focused on the awkwardness of applying the language of the rule
to defendant classes. This reasoning is summarized by the
Fourth Circuit in Paxman v. Campbell:
As is clear from the language of the rule, it is applicable to
situations in which a class of plaintiffs seeks injunctive relief
against a single defendant-the party opposing the class-who
has acted on grounds generally applicable to the plaintiff class.
To proceed under 23 (b)(2) against a class of defendants would
constitute the plaintiffs as "the party opposing the class," and
would create the anomalous situation in which the plaintiffs'
own actions or inactions could make injunctive relief against
the defendants appropriate.
163
Courts adopting this position ignore several important argu-
ments. First, although the language of 23(b)(2) is admittedly
awkward when applied to defendant class actions, support for
the maintenance of defendant class actions. exists in the lan-
guage of Rule 23 itself, which provides that a party may "sue or
160. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 484
U.S. 923 (1987), further proceedings deferred, 484 U.S. 1057 (1988); Thompson v. Board
of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983); Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981); Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638, 652 (N.D.
IM. 1983); Stewart v. Winter, 87 F.R.D. 760, 770 (N.D. Miss. 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 328
(5th Cir. 1982); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974). But see Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 669-70
(4th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part vacated in part on other grounds, 478 U.S. 385 (1986);
Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1238 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, sub. nom.
Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); Henson, 814 F.2d at 417-21 (Campbell, J.,
dissenting). Even Courts limiting the applicability of 23(b)(2) to defendant classes have
noted that certain types of (b)(2) defendant actions should be maintainable, such as a
declaratory judgment where the real plaintiffs are in the position of defendants, Henson,
814 F.2d at 414, or where a class of defendants acts in concert, Thompson, 709 F.2d at
1204; Paxman, 612 F.2d at 854, n.9.
161. See supra note 80.
162. Henson, 814 F.2d at 412-13; Comment, supra note 4, 33 UCLA IL. REv. at 306-
163. 612 F.2d at 854 (citations omitted).
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be sued.' 16 4 Nevertheless, in Henson v. East Lincoln Township,
Judge Posner suggests that the language, "sue or be sued as rep-
resentative parties", found in Rule 23(a) does not authorize de-
fendant classes in all types of Rule 23 actions.6 5 This conclusion
is inconsistent with the bulk of class action authority which re-
quires that all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) be met for each of
the 23(b) actions.166 Like the four prerequisites enumerated in
Rule 23(a), the language "sue or be sued" is obligatory, descrip-
tive language that applies equally to all three types of 23(b) ac-
tions. Strictly applying some of the language of Rule 23(a) to all
sections of 23(b) and selectively applying other language would
be anomalous absent some express authority to do so.'
6 7
However, even if the language of Rule 23(a) is not inter-
preted as requiring defendant classes, the particular language of
Rule 23(b)(2) permits such actions. If defendant class actions
were not intended by Rule 23's drafters to be within the purview
of 23(b)(2), the use of the circuitous phrase "party opposing the
class" cannot be explained since the single word "defendant"
would have best expressed the intention of the drafters.6 8
In addition to the express language of the Rule, defendant
class actions historically have been permitted under the Equity
Rules and then more recently under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 69 Finally, defendant class actions serve policy goals
of judicial efficiency and the enforcement of legislative and con-
stitutional norms.170
The emerging conflict over the interpretation of Rule
23(b)(2) is illustrative of a deeper problem than simply the lan-
164. See supra note 1.
165. 814 F.2d at 412.
166. See, e.g., Lawson v. Wainwright, 108 F.R.D. 450, 453 (S.D. Fla. 1986) ("Under
23(b)(2), Plaintiff is required to demonstrate the fulfillment of the prerequisites enumer-
ated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).").
167. With the exception of Henson and its progeny, no reported class action case
under any of the three 23(b) provisions even suggests that 23(a) does not apply equally
to each type of class action.
168. This argument is advanced thoroughly in Comment, supra note 3, at 1377.
169. Id. at 1380-83. The writer points out that under English chancery practice and
later in America, defendant class actions were permitted. The rationales supporting this
early group litigation were rooted in the desire to obtain efficient resolution of controver-
sies and the need to provide a forum for the redress of certain types of claims. Contra
Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 866, 869-70 (1977) (arguing that the early representational suits were
more like consensual settlement processes than the modern class action and were not a
method of controlling transaction costs).
170. Comment, supra note 3, at 1378-80.
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guage of Rule 23(b)(2). The cases questioning the rule did not
emerge until the late 1970's, over ten years after its adoption
and, according to Henson, after litigation in at least 45 cases. 171
Instead, the courts that have refused to certify (b)(2) defendant
class actions have expressed a deeper conviction that such ac-
tions are inherently unfair to the absent defendants. The lower
court in Henson, denying defendant class certification under
Rule 23(b)(2), concluded: "In addition to going beyond the ex-
press language of the rule, defendant classes present a greater
potential for violating the due process rights of absent class
members than a plaintiff class action. Because of this, it would
be improper to expand (b)(2) beyond its express provisions."'
172
Although clarification of the language of 23(b)(2) is cer-
tainly called for, clarification would not resolve the more troub-
lesome aspects of defendant class actions raised in this article.
Indeed, even if 23(b)(2) is held conclusively not to apply to de-
fendant classes, the due process concerns will continue to exist,
albeit to a lesser extent, in 23(b)(1) 1 3 actions and in 23(b)(3)'
4
actions where actual notice is not provided each absent member
of the defendant class.
175
V. SOLUTION
In order to protect the due process rights of absent defend-
ant class members, Rule 23 should be revised in two respects.
First Rule 23 should ensure that absent defendants will not be
bound by a class judgment unless they receive actual notice of
171. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
484 U.S. 923 (1987), further proceedings deferred, 484 U.S. 1057 (1988). Although the
opinion does not say so, these 45 cases appear to include only those that resulted in
reported opinions.
172. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 108 F.R.D. 107, 111 (C.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd,
814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 923 (1987), further proceedings deferred,
484 U.S. 1057 (1988).
173. Despite its limitations, defendant class actions have been certified under Rule
23(b)(1). See, e.g., In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 126 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Technograph Printed Circuits v. Methode Elecs., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
174. Although the "opt out" provisions accompanying 23(b)(3) actions may reduce
the utility of such a defendant class action, several defendant class actions have been
certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See, e.g., Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Express-
ways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415 (N.D.
Cal. 1985); Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Ill.
1983); In re Gap Store Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
175. See supra notes 67-100 and accompanying text. Because FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)
requires only the "best notice practicable under the circumstances," individual or actual
notice is not always guaranteed even in 23(b)(3) actions.
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the pendency of the action. This protection should be extended
so that it applies not only to actions under 23(b)(3) but also to
defendant class actions maintained under 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).
To accomplish this change, Rule 23(c)(2) should be revised as
follows:
(2) In any action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), and in
any defendant class action regardless of the subdivision under
which it is maintained, the court shall direct to the class the
best notice practicable under the circumstances, including indi-
vidual notice to all members who can be identified through rea-
sonable effort. An absent member of a defendant class shall
not be bound by a class action judgment if that member did
not receive actual notice of the pendency of the action. In all
actions maintained under Subdivision (b)(3) the notice shall
advise each member that (A) .... 176
In addition to providing for actual notice, Rule 23 should
also provide members of a defendant class the opportunity to
raise and litigate individual defenses which could not be liti-
gated by the class representative; such as lack of personal juris-
diction, improper venue, and choice of law. To accomplish this
revision, a new subdivision should be added to Rule 23(c). This
new subdivision-Rule 23(c)(5)-should provide:
(5) When an action is maintained against a class of defend-
ants, individual members of the class shall be given the op-
portunity to appear and litigate individual defenses which
could not have been raised or litigated by the class
representative.
The effect of these revisions is two-fold. First, they insure
that, in order to be bound by a later judgment, the members of a
defendant class must receive the same notice of the pending
class action against them that they would have received if they
had been sued individually. In addition, by preserving unique
individual defenses, the revisions ensure that a defendant can-
not be bound by a class action judgment under circumstances in
which that defendant could not have been individually bound.
Thus, the revisions essentially provide a de facto right to opt out
of the class for those potential class members whose due process
rights would be violated by enforced class litigation. At the same
time, the revisions protect the due process interests of absent
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (with proposed revisions in italics).
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members of a defendant class and preserve the utility of the de-
fendant class action as a potential method of obtaining efficien-
cies and enforcing judicial and legislative norms.
Two alternative revisions were considered and rejected. The
first alternative provided defendants in any of the three types of
class actions an unconditional right to opt out of the class. This
right to opt out would insure that the interests of the absent
defendants are protected because it would render defendant par-
ticipation in group litigation completely voluntary. However, an
unconditional opt out provision would likely defeat the utility of
defendant class actions unless there were a reason to expect that
defendants would not opt out of the class. Theoretically, the ar-
gument can be made that, because substantial benefits may in-
ure from defendant class litigation, absent defendants would
have an incentive to voluntarily participate in the class litiga-
tion. Particularly in situations where the risk of individual liabil-
ity is substantial and where the potential liability is significant,
the incentive for pooling defense resources might logically lead
rational defendants to participate in group litigation. 17 7 How-
ever, defendants have opted out of 23(b)(3) classes in large num-
bers even in situations where plaintiffs have expressed their in-
tent to individually sue any defendant who opts out of the
class.178 Mass desertion of class litigation has been avoided in
situations where the trial judge has resorted to drastic manage-
ment techniques such as appointing lead counsel and requiring
defendants appearing individually to pay lead counsel's fees and
appear only through lead counsel. 917 However, these techniques
essentially enforce class litigation under the guise of joinder
177. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Fox and Co., 102 F.R.D. 507, 515
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Plaintiffs respond that class members have substantial incentives to
remain in this litigation and that there is, therefore, no strong likelihood that most class
members will choose to opt out. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that under the circum-
stances of this case, the chances of a substantial number of class members choosing to
"opt out" are not sufficiently great to justify denial of class certification.").
178. For example, counsel for the parties in both Thillens, Inc. v. Community Cur-
rency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Il1. 1983), and In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F.
Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1985), reported to the author in phone conversations that signifi-
cant numbers of defendant class members opted out of the class. In both cases, counsel
for plaintiffs had expressed their intent to join any "opting out" defendant individually
and, in fact, did so.
179. Plaintiff's counsel in Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 668, reported that the court mini-
mized the number of defendants opting out of the class by appointing lead counsel for
the opting out group, requiring them to pay lead counsel's fees and permitting appear-
ance only through lead counsel.
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without even the protections of the present Rule 23. Thus, the
experience in 23(b)(3) actions is that defendants have opted out
when they have been permitted to do so, and massive joinder of
individual defendants has been necessary in order to preserve
the utility of the action.
The second alternative considered and rejected was to pro-
vide absent members of a defendant class a guaranteed right of
intervention. This proposal would permit defense participation
in the litigation and would preserve, at least in theory, the util-
ity of a defendant class action. However, traditional intervention
would not adequately address the concerns raised earlier in this
article. Traditional notions of intervention require that the in-
tervening defendant waive individual defenses such as lack of
personal jurisdiction and improper venue by voluntarily appear-
ing and defending in the action.180 Thus, the intervention ap-
proach does not address the Rule 82 problems of the current
rule since a plaintiff could still compel a defendant to litigate
under circumstances in which, but for the class action device,
the defendant could not be forced to litigate. Perhaps more seri-
ously, the intervention proposal would not address the individ-
ual due process problems presented by forcing defendants to lit-
igate in a forum where personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained
over them, where venue is improper and where they have had no
contact with the law applied. To the extent this article has
shown that such litigation violates the defendant's due process
rights, then the intervention alternative, by failing to address
these concerns, is fundamentally inadequate. Finally, permitting
wholesale intervention by absent defendants could destroy any
efficiencies obtained by class litigation by creating potentially
insurmountable manageability problems.
The proposed revisions address the problems raised by the
two rejected alternatives by providing only those defendants
with a demonstrable due process interest with a right to appear
individually and litigate unique individual defenses. Because the
proposed revisions limit the appearance of absent defendant
class members to defenses that "could not have been" raised by
the named defendants, only class members with clearly distinct
interests will be able to take advantage of the provision.
The proposed revisions do not change the position of an ab-
sent defendant who raises a collateral attack to the enforcement
180. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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of a class action judgment. In fact, by forcing the class action
court to provide an opportunity for absent defendants to raise
and litigate individual defenses, proposed Rule 23(c)(5) makes it
clear that the class action court must have personal jurisdiction
over the members of a defendant class and that venue in the
class action court must be appropriate as to all members of the
defendant class. The clarification places collaterally attacking
defendants in the same position as they would have occupied
had a default judgment been entered against them in an individ-
ual suit. To the extent such a default could be collaterally at-
tacked, so could the class action judgment.
A potential concern raised by proposed Rule 23(c)(5) is that
this revision may unreasonably delay disposition of the class is-
sues pending the resolution of individual defenses. The proposed
revision purposefully avoids delineating the point in the litiga-
tion at which the opportunity to appear and defend must be
provided. If postponing the litigation of personal defenses would
cause significant harm to absent class members, the court could
delay the disposition of class issues pending the appearance of
objecting class members. Such a delay, however, would not be
required. When substantial damage would not occur if class is-
sues are litigated first, the court could hold hearings on individ-
ual class objections after the disposition of class issues.
Rule 23 should clearly provide for the handling of defendant
class actions and should address the potential fairness concerns
presented by them. The above revision of the rule would accom-
plish these goals.
